models of party constitutionalization, and addresses the question what these convey about the underlying conceptions of party democracy. It argues that the constitutionalization of the democratic importance of parties enables them to turn to the state for legitimacy and for organizational resources, thereby turning parties into quasi-official public agencies, and suggests that the constitutionalization of parties might reflect an attempt to legitimize their existence in the face of their weakening as agents of democratic representation.

Constitutions and party democracy
In contemporary democracies, political parties are usually regarded as vital political institutions for the organization of the modern democratic polity as well as for the expression and manifestation of political participation and pluralism. 2 Political parties have come to be seen as desirable and procedurally necessary for the effective functioning of democracy, even amidst increasing concern that their actual functioning is inadequate for a healthy performance of democracy.
The relevance of political parties for modern democracy has also become recognized increasingly in constitutional terms, underlining the relevance of parties as political parties in their constitutions adopted after the restoration of democracy. This practice of party constitutionalization has since been followed in constitutional revisions in many other polities, 3 to the point that the large majority of European democracies today acknowledge the existence political parties in their constitutions in one form or
another. Indeed, in many contemporary democratic constitutions, key democratic principles such as political participation, representation, pluralism and competition have come to be defined increasingly, if not almost exclusively, in terms of party. In many of the more recently established democracies that emerged out of recent waves of democratization in particular, where the very establishment of democratic procedures was often identified with the establishment of free competition between parties, political parties were often attributed a pivotal role and privileged constitutional position as the key instruments for the expression of political pluralism and as vehicles of participation.
Despite the increased relevance of the constitution for the place of political parties in modern democracy, the process of party constitutionalization and its implications have received little systematic scholarly attention from political scientists or constitutional lawyers. Germany, the 'heartland of party law' forms a possible exception, 4 but even in the German case there is a noticeable lack of political science literature on the constitution. 5 The subject of party law more generally is a neglected aspect of research on political parties, with discussions of party law in the scholarly literature usually limited to passing references and lacking a comparative dimension. 6 This is all the more surprising given that political parties in contemporary democracies have become increasingly subject to regulations and laws which govern their external and internal behaviour and activities. According to Katz, party structures have now become 'legitimate objects of state regulation to a degree far exceeding what would normally be acceptable for private associations in a liberal society.' 7 This relative lack of attention to the legal position of political parties is even more manifest at the level of their formal constitutional codification, as constitutions are not normally considered a source of party law. 8 As Bogdanor observes, 'it is perhaps because the law has been so late in recognizing political parties that constitutional lawyers and other writers on the constitution have taken insufficient note of the fact that parties are so central to our constitutional arrangements'. 9 However, although topics related to the law have traditionally received scarce attention from comparative political scientists, a 'new constitutionalism' has swept across Europe which makes it increasingly difficult for scholars to research issues of government and governance without also running into public law. 10 From a legal perspective, therefore, the constitutional codification of parties implies that the constitution has become an important source of party law.
In addition, the constitution is an important source for investigations into the character of modern democracy. At the broadest level, this contention builds on insights in the party literature that have emerged from the study of the 'official story' of party organizations, 12 although in this case the formal documents under investigation are the national country constitutions rather than the internal party statutes. Like the official rules that govern the internal organization of a party, the formal constitution of a national political system offers a fundamental and indispensable guide to the character of a given polity. Constitutions comprise a set of fundamental values, however incomplete and unrealistic, and outline the procedural rules that allow for the exercise of power. As Sartori has argued, it is in the constitution in particular that the organizational base of the state can be found. 13 In most liberal democracies, constitutions aim to 'regulate the allocation of power, functions and duties among the various agencies and officers of government, and to define the relationships between these and the public.' 14 Constitutions thus define the composition and scope of authority of the organs of the state and the institutions in the public sphere, as well as the distribution of power between them. Furthermore, premised on the liberal model of constrained government, they define the relationship between the institutions of the state and the citizen, posing injunctions on public authority and identifying a private sphere that requires protection vis-à-vis the state. From this perspective, the constitutional codification of political parties thus provides an indication of their place within the institutional architecture of the democratic polity, as well as their relationship with the citizens within it.
Thirdly, in addition to defining the formal rules of the game, the constitution is an important source for an investigation into the underlying normative ideas about the place of political parties in modern democracy. As few, if any, institutional preferences are politically neutral, choices about the substance of the rules are themselves not above politics. 15 Decisions on the regulation of party activity, organization and behaviour follow from particular conceptions of party and democracy, and different norms and conceptions of democracy may lead to divergent prescriptions about the appropriate legal regulation of parties. 16 The The first observation to be made is that the earliest constitutionalization of 
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This provision from the Weimar constitution is indicative of a particular attitude towards political parties in the early days of mass democracy, when the dominant democratic ideology did not allow for intermediaries between the individual and the general will. As a consequence, parties were often seen as a threat to the supposedly neutral and long-term transcendental general interest and the common good. 25 As the size of democratic polities expanded with the consolidation of modern large-scale nation-states, however, direct links between the state and the individual became increasingly unfeasible. This, coupled with a shift in the dominant meaning of 'democracy', from an historical conception inspired by city-state style direct democracy in favour of representative government in the broader polity of the nation-state, legitimized the status of parties as intermediary institutions between individual citizens and the state. As parties in the post-war era underwent an ideational transformation by which they gradually come to be seen as democratically legitimate as well as procedurally necessary for democracy, the notion of parties changes also in terms of their constitutional codification.
This is perhaps best illustrated with the example of the Federal Republic of
Germany, where article 21 of the 1949 Basic Law regulates issues such as the freedom of political parties, their role in the formation of the political will, intra-party democracy, and the duty of parties to account for their assets. Furthermore, the German constitution does not tolerate political parties with purposes or activities antithetical to the democratic constitutional order, a provision which has subsequently provided the foundation for a constitutional ban on the descendants of Nazi and Communist
Parties. 26 More specifically, article 21 of the Basic Law, as amended in 1984, states:
(1) The political parties participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles.
They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds as well as assets. Moreover, although the Italian and German constitutions accept political parties in the plural, and thus by implication the existence of a multi-party system, 32 Spain is the first post-war European democracy explicitly to identify parties as key instruments for the expression of political pluralism.
In the most recent case of party constitutionalization in Luxembourg, parties are explicitly identified with the realization of fundamental democratic values and principles such popular sovereignty, participation and democratic pluralism. In 2008 it was approved that a new article 32bis was to be added to the Luxembourg constitution, stipulating that:
Political parties contribute to the formation of the popular will and the expression of universal suffrage. They express democratic pluralism. 33 This amendment was motivated by the perceived need to modernize the constitution in line with the political reality of representative democracy and a desire to underscore the importance of political parties for a healthy functioning of the democratic system.
Waves of party constitutionalization
The chronology of party constitutionalization is represented more schematically in Figure 1 . One important observation that can be made on the basis of the pattern displayed here is that the process of post-war party constitutionalization was not gradual
or linear but appears to have occurred in clusters. These correspond closely to the waves which Huntington has observed for democratization processes and which Elster has identified as waves of constitution-making. 35 Ukraine as a relative latecomer in 1996.
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The waves of democratization correspond closely to processes of constitutionwriting, as new constitutions are nearly always related to major social upheavals such as revolutions, wars, regime collapse, or the creation of a new state. 38 The constitutionalization of political parties also appears to be connected to both the drafting of the new constitutions and the processes of democratization and state formation.
Political parties were thus incorporated in the very first constitutions adopted by the newly established democratic states. This suggests, as Kopecký has observed in the context of the post-communist democracies, that among the designers of the new democratic constitutions a conception of democracy seems to have prevailed in which political parties are the core foundation of a democratic polity. 39 Like processes of democratization and constitution-writing, the constitutionalization of political parties is thus also related to moments of institutional become increasingly common for constitutions to imagine the political subject in terms of positive and negative liberty. 43 Within this domain, one category ('rights and freedoms') encompasses constitutional provisions which outline the position of political parties in terms of basic democratic liberties, such as the freedom of association, the freedom of assembly, or the freedom of speech. Two further categories ('activity/behaviour' and 'identity/programme') include the duties of parties to abide by certain rules on permissible forms of party activity and behaviour, on the one hand, or ideological and programmatic identity, on the other. These typically entail restrictions on the parties' basic democratic rights and freedoms.
3) Institutional structure: constitutions also contain regulations concerning the institutional organization of the polity. Broadly speaking, these deal with the rules for the 'establishment, transfer, exercise and control of political power'. 44 They outline the structure of the political system, sketch out the selection, composition and powers of the various state organs, and describe the various hierarchical vertical and horizontal relationships between them. Hence, this domain encompasses constitutional provisions which position political parties within the broader structure of the political system.
Because parties are not monolithic entities but can be disaggregated into various interconnected components or 'faces', 45 this domain has been broken down into various sub-categories, including constitutional rules that apply to the extra-parliamentary organization, or the political party as a whole ('extra-parliamentary party'), parties in their electoral capacity ('electoral party'), parties as parliamentary groups ('parliamentary party') and the party in public office ('governmental party'). A further category within this wider rubric pertaining to the organizational structure of the political system ('public resources') refers to constitutional provisions which entitle political parties to public resources, such as state funding or time on state-owned broadcasting media.
4) Meta-rules:
constitutions contain meta-rules, or rules of constitutional interpretation, which deal with 'questions of constitutional validity, amendment and change' and outline the conditions for the revision and interpretation of the constitution. 46 These may include provisions on the establishment and prerogatives of a constitutional court, for example, or the general procedures for judicial review. Furthermore, these rules often determine the hierarchy within the legal order by defining the constitution as the 'supreme law' vis-à-vis ordinary legislation and by stipulating that the latter be in conformity with the constitution. Within this domain, the category of 'judicial oversight' corresponds to the rules which establish external judicial control on the lawfulness and constitutionality of party activity and identity, while 'secondary legislation' encompasses constitutional provisions which reflect the hierarchical legal order and dictate the enactment of further legislation on political parties. The evidence presented in Table 2 shows that exactly half of the countries In part, this may be a consequence of the growing importance that the constitutional bill of rights has now acquired as the essence of democracy. 48 In addition, it follows from the way in which the constitutional design of the newer democracies, and the post-communist ones in particular, tended to position the state and society vis-à-vis one another in the wake of democratization: the corollary of the liberalization of formerly non-democratic polities was often the constitutional establishment of an explicitly private sphere of social life, guaranteed by a judicially enforceable bill of rights. 49 The constitutional recognition of political parties in terms of fundamental democratic liberties in the post-nondemocratic regimes can thus be understood, at least in part, in light of the desire to identify and strengthen a private sphere which is free from state intervention.
At the same time, and seemingly paradoxically, these are also the kinds of regimes which appear most likely to constrain party ideology or behaviour, as is shown by the high incidence of provisions in the 'activity' and 'identity' categories. Many constitutions in the newly established and re-established democracies prohibit political parties which are adverse to the fundamental values of the democratic constitutional order. In an attempt to safeguard the democratic regime from insurrectionary and separatist parties, these constitutions thus demand that parties respect democratic principles, as well as the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. In doing so, they follow a general pattern whereby post-war constitutions typically reaffirm human rights in general, but also make efforts to restrict these rights in such a way as to make them unavailable to the enemies of constitutional democracy. 50 This suggests that political parties are only qualified bearers of the democratic freedoms of association and speech: parties retain their rights only 'to the extent that they are the essential servants of the democratic process.' 51 Banning parties or impeding their activities touches upon the problem of 'democratic intolerance', i.e. 'the intolerance that democratic governments exhibit toward antidemocratic actors in the name of preserving the governments' fundamental democratic character.' 52 The idea of 'intolerant democracies' appears an increasingly compelling notion, which has also been reiterated at the supra-national level. Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights, for example, guarantees basic rights of association and assembly, including the right to form political parties, but also establishes that these can be restricted in the interest of national security or public safety. Thus, democratic rights of tolerance and freedom 'should not be stretched so far as to allow the overthrow of those institutions that guarantee them'. A threat to the 'unalterable, substantive core of liberal-democratic values' may call for the invocation of procedures that might, paradoxically, require these basic democratic rights to be overridden.' 53 The European Court of Human Rights, in its adjudication on the banning of the Welfare Party in Turkey, has further affirmed 'the power inherent in democratic states to take preemptive action against threats to pluralistic democratic rule', without necessarily demanding 'proof of the imminence of democracy's demise'. 54 Although controversial from the perspective of some normative theories democracy, intervention in the internal affairs and external activities of parties is thus justified with a view to protecting the very survival of the democratic system.
Constitutions not only impose limits and constraints on party activity and behaviour, or their ideological and programmatic profile, they also heavily regulate internal party organizational structures. As can be seen from Table 2 Various constitutions demand, furthermore, that the internal structures and organization of political parties are democratic. This requirement was made first explicit in the German Basic Law and has since been adopted in a number of other countries as well. In doing so, these countries take the 'democratic intolerance' argument a step further by demanding that the parties themselves must reflect a commitment to democratic principles if together they are to form a democratic polity. On this view, efforts to guarantee that parties will not disrupt or destroy democratic government should not be confined to the constitutional control over their aims and behaviour but also over the party organization itself. Gardner, for example, argues in favour of 'broadly inclusive internal procedures' which may counteract the potential of parties to become dominated by a largely unaccountable leadership. 55 Internal party democracy thus may alleviate concerns which arise from the inevitable predisposition towards oligarchization of large and complex organizations such as parties, as famously described by Michels' 'Iron Law'. In the same vein, Mersel argues that political parties must be held to the core conditions of democracy, both externally in their goals and internally in their organizational structures, and that a lack of internal democracy should be considered sufficient grounds to ban a party because it 'may be seen as evidence of external nondemocracy.' 56 This is also the perspective advocated by the German Constitutional Court, arguing in its ruling on the constitutionality of the neo-Nazi
Sozialistische Reichspartei that a logical relationship exists between the concept of a free democratic order and the democratic principles of party organization. 57 The rationale for imposing a duty of internal democracy on party organizations thus centres on a substantive rather than procedural conception of democracy, according to which
key democratic values such as representation and participation cannot be realized in the absence of internally democratic parties. 58 From an alternative perspective, however, it can been argued that, because parties are not the state, the need for certain democratic values to be realized within the political system does not necessarily require the same values to be realized within all of the existing parties. It is in fact far from evident that democracy at the system level requires, or is indeed furthered by, parties that are democratic with regard to their internal structures and procedures. As Sartori has famously put it, 'democracy on a large scale is not the sum of many little democracies'. 59 While internal democracy may be indispensable from the perspective of certain participatory theories of democracy, there is a significant body of democratic theory that takes an opposite view. 60 Internal party democracy might produce policy choices that are further removed from preferences of the median voter, for example. Given the continuous decline of party memberships in modern democracies, party members constitute an increasingly unrepresentative group of citizens, socially and professionally if not ideologically. 61 This makes the outcome of internally democratic procedures restricted to party members less and less likely to represent 'the will of the people'. Furthermore, from a conception of democracy which centres primarily on the maximization of voter choice and political competition, there are no compelling reasons to impose internally democratic structures upon the parties as long as the system guarantees, in Hirschman's terms, sufficiently meaningful 'exit' options (e.g. membership exit or electoral defeat).
From this perspective, it is difficult to identify the interest of the state in so tightly controlling the internal governance of political parties. Such attempts, Issacharoff argues, bring 'the force of state authority deep into the heart of all political organizations', and raise serious concerns about the relationship between political parties and the state. More fundamentally, such impositions threaten to compromise the political integrity of the parties and their organizational independence from the state.
'Political parties play a key role in providing a mechanism for informed popular participation in a democracy precisely because they are organizationally independent of the state.' 62 However, as the internal life and the external activities of parties become regulated by public law and as party rules become constitutional or administrative rules, the parties themselves become transformed into semi-state agencies or public service entities, with a corresponding weakening of their own internal organizational autonomy. 63 In addition, the primary locus of accountability is shifted from the internal organs of the party towards external state institutions. of parties be preserved and in which circumstances do they serve as state actors. 69 In their capacity as state actors, the parties become legitimate objects of state regulation.
This also implies, however, that they more closely resemble public utilities than private associations. 70 This section explores the existing conceptions about the place of political parties within modern democracy which lie beneath the constitutional codification of political parties, with a special emphasis on the consequences of their position vis-à-vis civil society and the state.
On the basis of the content analysis of the national constitutions it appears possible to distinguish at least three different models -Modern Party Government, Defending Democracy, and Public Utilities -each of which reflects a particular understanding of the place of political parties within the democratic system. These constitutional models are the product of a factor analysis, which yields three underlying components of party constitutionalization. Together these three factors explain almost 70 percent of the variation in the data. 71 The This has implied the emergence of the cartel party, which is characterized by the interpenetration of parties and the state as well as by a pattern of inter-party collusion rather than competition. In the era of the cartel party, the main parties work together and take advantage of the resources of the state to ensure their collective survival.
In addition to the increasing dependence of parties on public subsidies, which was given a pre-eminent position as a key indicator of cartelization in the original article, van Biezen and Kopecký have argued that the management of party organization, activity and behaviour through public law and the constitution forms an equally important dimension of the party-state relationship. 77 Indeed, both the public subsidization and regulation of political parties can be interpreted as the two principal forms by which the modern state tends to intervene in contemporary party politics. 78 Together these processes have contributed to an ideational transformation of political parties from voluntary and private associations, which developed within society, into the equivalent of public utilities, which are justified by appealing to a conception of democracy which sees parties as an essential public good.
Conclusion
The increased intensity of party constitutionalization in post-war European democracies underscores that political parties are considered to be an important political and social reality which are seen to make an essential contribution to the functioning of democracy. Their constitutional importance is no longer limited to the role they play during periods of elections. Instead they have acquired a more permanent relevance as the vehicles per excellence for the expression of political pluralism and as channels of political participation. One of the most significant developments in this regard was the constitutional establishment of political parties as the constituent foundations of democracy following the re-establishment of democracy in the immediate post-war period in Italy and Germany. Constitutional diffusion in subsequent waves of democratization has furthered the process of party constitutionalization, to the point that, constitutionally, modern democracy has to an important extent become defined in terms of parties. This is so at the level of the party system -in terms of inter-party competition -as well as the level of the individual party organization -in terms of intra-party democracy. Furthermore, parties are constitutionally defined both in terms of their representative capacity and as an essential component of the institutional infrastructure of the state. As one of the consequences of their incorporation in the national constitutions, alongside the development of extensive legal frameworks of party regulation, the institutional relevance of political parties has now been firmly anchored within the overall architecture of most modern democratic systems. Indeed, in one of its various rulings on issues of party law, the German Constitutional Court has declared that political parties are more than mere socio-political organizations; they are also the integral and necessary units of the constitutional order. 79 Within modern democratic constitutions, we find different, and competing, conceptions of party democracy. Moreover, political parties seem to occupy a somewhat ambiguous space in the political system at the interstices of government and civil society, as constitutions have been unable to develop a coherent framework for defining the relationship between the parties, the state and the individual. On the one hand, parties may be identified as private subjects with corresponding democratic rights and freedoms, while many constitutions also attempt to keep them separate from those state institutions which are meant to be neutral and non-partisan (e.g. bureaucracy, judiciary, head of state). In addition, parties are rarely assigned any influence on functions which fall within the domain of government or executive power. 80 The constitutional codification of political parties has consolidated both the empirical reality of modern party government and the normative belief that parties are indispensible for democracy. Constitutionally, the democratic significance of parties lies primarily in the contribution they are seen to make to the realization of substantive democratic principles such as participation and representation of the popular will. Paradoxically, however, the constitutional prioritization of their representative functions enables parties to turn to the state, both for legitimacy and for organizational resources, thereby turning them into quasi-official public agencies. It is furthermore intriguing that the constitutionalization of the democratic importance of parties has acquired significance in an era in which democratic polities are faced with the weakening of parties as agents of democratic participation and representation. As
European democracies are suffering from growing popular disengagement from conventional politics, the linkages between parties and civil society are subsequently becoming progressively weaker. Whereas they once drew their legitimacy from their actual representative capacities, parties now justify themselves by appealing to a shared and constitutionally codified norm which increasingly diverges from political reality. Indeed, the constitutionalization of the parties' democratic importance might well reflect an attempt to legitimize their own existence in the face of their weakening as agents of democratic representation.
